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ABSTRACT 
The migration to Electronic Health Records (EHR) has raised issues with respect to 
security and privacy. One such issue that has become a concern for the healthcare providers, 
insurance companies and pharmacies is Patient Health Information (PHI) leak. Borrowing from 
Document Control Domain (DCD) literature, in this paper, we develop a methodology for 
detection and mitigation of PHI leaks by employing Activity Theory to elucidate the complex 
activities in the transitive workflow. 
Keywords: Patient health information, Information leak detection and mitigation, Activity 
Theory, Security policies 
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INTRODUCTION 
As a cost-reduction measure, many healthcare providers are moving the personal health 
information (PHI) into electronic format, also known as Electronic Health Records (EHR). When 
these electronic means become the prime instrument for storage and exchange of personal health 
data, the risks of inadvertent disclosure of PHI increase (Sokolova et al. 2009). Migration to 
EHR for efficient health care service opens up issues with respect to security and privacy 
(Rengamani et al. 2010). These security and privacy issues lead to user workarounds. In many 
areas of healthcare, workarounds can be infectious creating new information risks and patient 
data leaks (Johnson et al. 2012).  
PHI leak has become a concern for the healthcare providers, insurance companies and 
pharmacies – that deal with the confidential information of the patients – and the consequences 
have been severe. These PHI leaks could be happening due to a variety of reasons (Mishra et al. 
2011). Rengamani et al. (2010) identify routine events such as data sharing, file organization, 
software installation, amongst others as leak factors, while (Sokolova et al. 2012) identify 
political events and advertisements resulting in PHI leaks. In addition, Cox (2010) identifies the 
various channels of the Internet resulting in PHI leak, and Lewis (2010) identifies data theft and 
fraud as the factors. 
In the recent years, the document control domain (DCD) has provided numerous 
frameworks for detecting and mitigating information leaks, such as originator-based access 
control (Krohn et al. 2004), propagated access control (Jajodia et al. 2001), role-based access 
control (Sandhu et al. 2000), enforceable security policy (Schneider, 2000), Harrison, Russo and 
Ullman (HRU) model (Zhang et al. 2005), typed access matrix model (Samarati and De Capitani 
Di Vimercati 2001), etc. While the work done in DCD has been extensive, it has not been 
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utilized in addressing PHI leaks in a healthcare setting. Thus, borrowing from the DCD 
literature, and following the guidelines provided by Pramanik et al. (2004), as a solution to PHI 
leak problem, we develop a methodology for detection and mitigation of PHI leaks. 
Hospitals in the healthcare systems are complex because of the intricacy of their 
information workflows. The transitive nature of the information workflow is a case in point, as 
the data flows from one point to the other in the workflow. The workflow consists of complex 
activities typically involving multiple agencies. Shanker et al. (2009) suggested Activity Theory 
to understand the various activities in the workflow.  Activity theory is a powerful and clarifying 
descriptive tool with the objective to understand the activity (Nardi 1995). It gives the flexibility 
of breaking up complex tasks into activities that are easy to interpret and manage. It has been 
utilized for human-computer interaction. Thus, in this paper, we use activity theory as a lens for 
the development of our methodology. We adapt activity theory to align its components to capture 
the rights of the user in an organization on the patient data set and provide rules to access patient 
data set based on user’s context. Consequently, the adapted activity theory provides guidance to 
detect and mitigate leak.  
There are three major contributions of our work to existing literature: (a) we develop a 
methodology to detect and mitigate PHI leaks, (b) we advocate access control for transitive 
health workflows, and (c) we adapt activity theory to enforce security policies. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide the literature on 
transitive workflows. Then, we describe activity theory. In the subsequent section, we provide 
the leak scenario. Next, we state the design considerations of security policies for PHI leak 
detection and mitigation. Then, we detail the leak detection and mitigation using activity theory.  
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TRANSITIVE WORKFLOWS 
In a healthcare system, the data flows from multiple sources, which in turn receive data 
from other such sources. This type of relationship is referred to as transitive relationship. A 
transitive relationship is one where multiple sources exchange information with multiple others 
over several steps in the workflow (Lechler et al. 2011). The transitive workflow is the most 
general case of data exchange (Weber-Jahnke and Obry 2011).  
Table 1 highlights the data typically shared between organizations. It also depicts the 
various data sharing authorizations that the patient data is a part of. Finally, the data set is 
simplified from various discrete data points. 
Table 1. Patient Data Set 
Type of Information Data Set Authorization Optional Control 
Identifying Information Name 
SSN 
ID 
Governmental, 
Insurance, Research 
Commercial: 
(vendor supported) 
 
General:   (service 
applications) 
 
Other: (unspecified) 
Demographics 
Information 
Gender 
Race 
Ethnicity 
Governmental, Insurance 
Personal Information Email 
Phone 
Fax 
Address 
Date of Birth 
Insurance 
Medical Information Diagnosis 
Treatment 
Governmental, Insurance 
Other Information Health Plan 
Account Numbers 
Insurance 
	  
ACTIVITY THEORY 
Activity theory is more of a descriptive theory (than a prescriptive one) that provides a 
lens to describe or analyze the activity of a group or an organization. It involves the concepts of 
subject, object and community supported by tools, rules and division of labor. It suggests that an 
activity is directed towards an object, mediated by the instrument and socially constituted within 
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the environment (Bertelsen and Bodker 2003). The subject is the individual or the 
group/organization performing the activity supported by instruments (such as obligations). The 
object can be either an ideal or a material object. During this interaction, the subjects confine 
their understanding of the relationship between them and environment consisting of rules, 
responsibilities and communities (Chen et al. 2012).  
Engestrom extends the concept of activity theory, and gives a specific example of its 
usage in a hospital setting. The activity considered is that of a doctor diagnosing a patient. In this 
activity, the subject is the physician, the diagnosis is directed towards the objective of patient’s 
preliminary assessment, and is supported by the instruments such as stethoscope. The community 
in which the activity is placed is physician and nurse, with constraints of patient authorization 
before disclosure to any entity, and responsibility of assisting the patient. 
In our paper, activity theory is used to detect and mitigate information leaks in a hospital 
setting, which is discussed in detail in Section 6. 
LEAK SCENARIOS 
In this section, we focus on potential leaks in a PHI. Based on these, we will formulate 
design considerations of security policies necessary to overcome these leaks. The healthcare 
domain can be visualized as a corporate network of users. Each user belongs to a role with a 
specific function, usually dictated by the nature of the organization. During the course of work, 
the role utilizes and shares a variety of information related to the patient. In order to provide this 
patient information to the users, organizations request this information from other health 
organizations in the network. The transfer of health information results in transitive information 
workflows. The most common case of transitive information workflow is data sharing supported 
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by software vendors that have a complete patient data access in about three quarters of hospitals 
(Johnson 1998), and is further explained next.  
Table 2 shows a scenario adapted from (Lechler et al. 2011) where the research facility 
uses software vendor for functions involving identifiable data, personal data and medical data, 
and the service organization uses a software vendor for supporting personal data and medical 
data. This data might be saved in vendor’s possession (as is the case with cloud service providing 
vendors). The vendor may now be able to match patient data provided by the research facilities 
with that provided by the service organizations and derive more information than a single entity 
(research affiliate or service organization) intended for the vendor. In such a case, the vendors 
could leak information by aggregating the data obtained from different sources.  
Table 2. Leak Scenario 
From Hospital Hospital Research Service 
To Research Service Vendor Vendor 
Identifying Data X X X X 
Demographics Data  X   
Personal Data X X X  
Medical Data X X X X 
Other Data  X  X 
	  
The above example demonstrates that owing to transitive workflows, the risk of 
information leakage increases in that the vendors might maliciously use patient treatment 
information, whose compromise to the outside world could lead to reputation loss for the patient. 
Thus, it is critical to detect leak and mitigate leak at the system level in order to achieve higher 
levels of information security. In addition, if there are no constraints on the privileges in the form 
of access control, then a malicious user or organization is capable of inflicting serious damage to 
the patient information. 
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POLICY DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
To design a policy specification to prevent the leak in a health organization, we need to 
consider both the context and information flow between requests. We take an approach where 
multiple policies are specified on the same data set. The policies differ in the context when they 
become applicable. For example, a policy might allow access to a data set on a machine owned 
by the organization but not on other personal computers. The current context is contained in the 
request for access or is maintained on the policy server. We refer to such policies as contextual 
policies. Setting up a highly granular access control mechanism can be arduous. So, for ease of 
implementation, we consider higher level of structure, for instance, the role of users instead of 
each user, the organization instead of each department and the data set instead of each data value.   
Consider a healthcare setting with a set of roles S and a set of patient data D that they 
want to protect. Each role s∈S has some attributes that can be represented as a tuple <s1, s2, …, 
sn>. The attributes can be the name of the role, its classification in the organization, its 
credentials and so on. Each data set d∈D also has attributes <d1, d2, …, dm>, representing 
features such as name of the data set, the category of the data set (e.g., sensitive, public, etc.), the 
type of data set (e.g., demographics, personal, etc.) and so on. The data set will have a set of 
actions A that can be performed on them. Each organization z∈Z also has attributes <z1, z2, …, 
zk>. These attributes can be the name of the organization, its classification in the healthcare 
setting, etc. Each authorization a∈A is specified as a tuple <s, z>. Here s∈S specifies the role that 
has action (e.g., view data) allowed in an organization z∈Z. We denote the set of policies as P. 
Each access control policy p∈P is specified as a tuple <d, {Rule1, Rule2, …}>. Here d∈D 
specifies the target of the policy and rules specify the actions allowed/denied to roles. The rules 
are the conditions under the current context.  
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The critical parts of the policy are the contexts and the obligations.  The contexts are 
conditions that are based on the known configurations. The obligations are requirements that are 
already specified in the policy statement. Both the contexts and obligations are specified in 
propositional logic on the subject attributes, object attributes and other system attributes. For all 
data actions performed, a request is generated which contains the role, data set, organization and 
other client side information. The response contains policy enforcement and the obligations 
enforcement. Table 3 shows the various entities in our security policy.  
Table 3. Entities in Security Policy 
Entity Description 
S Set of roles of subjects 
<s1, s2, … sn> Attributes of roles 
D Data Set 
<d1, d2, … dm> Attributes of data set 
Z Organizations 
<z1, z2, … zk> Attributes of organizations 
A Set of authorizations 
a = <S, Z> Authorization on roles in organizations 
C Context 
O Obligation 
Q Set of request 
q = <S, D, Z> Request of roles in organizations on data set 
V Response action 
v = <permit/deny> Action of permit or deny 
R Set of rules 
r = <S, A, V, C> Rule specification 
P Set of policies 
p = <D, R> Policy of rules on data set 
	  
INFORMATION LEAK DETECTION AND MITIGATION 
Activity theory recognizes that changing conditions can realign the constituents of an 
activity (Shanker et al. 2009). The alignment of activity theory components with information 
leak can be made as follows (see Table 4): inner triangle comprising of subject, object and 
community can be used as a framework for leak detection, and outer triangle comprising of 
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instrument, rule and responsibility can be used as a framework for leak mitigation. This is 
explained in detail. 
Definition 1 – Information Flow: There is an information flow between organizations og1 and 
og2 represented as og1–>og2, if og2 requests patient data from og1. 
Definition 2 – Privilege Set: A privilege set is a tuple based on activity theory’s inner triangle 
<subject, object, community>, and represented as <s, d, z>, where s is a user role in the 
organization z that has access to data type d.  
Definition 3 – Policy Set: A policy set is a tuple based on activity theory’s outer triangle <rule, 
tool, responsibility>, and represented as <p, O, N>, where p is a policy containing rules to 
provide the access N based on obligation O. In order to map the policy set to activity theory’s 
outer triangle, consider the contextual policy p as the specification of the set of rules, obligation 
O as the specification of requirements in the form of tools, and access N as specification 
responsibility that users have on a data set. 
Table 4. Leak Detection and Mitigation using Activity Theory 
Activity theory adapted from (Shanker 
et al. 2009) 
 
 
Le
ak
 D
et
ec
tio
n Subject:  
Object: 
 
Community: 
User roles including physician, 
nurse, staff, administrator, etc. 
Data type such as personal, 
demographics, medical, etc. 
Organizations such as hospital, 
research, commercial, etc. 
Le
ak
 M
iti
ga
tio
n Instrument: 
 
Rule: 
 
Responsibility: 
Obligations such as network login, 
registered machine use, etc. 
Contextual policies including rules 
such as password change, etc. 
Access (permit/deny) on privilege 
such as view, edit, delete, etc. 
	  
The privilege set is a representation of rights a user in an organization has on the patient 
data. It is created only once when a new patient is enrolled, and modified as per the patient’s 
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requirements. The policy set is a representation of rules that provide access based on user’s 
obligation. It is constructed at the onset of each workflow when the user requests the patient data.  
As an initial setup, we start with a pool of patients and their data set. Once the system is 
deployed, its first task is to build the privilege set of all users in the organization. The privilege 
sets are generated based on the policies specified on the documents. The leak detection triangle 
of activity theory is used to generate the privilege sets for all the users in the organizations. The 
policy sets get created and deleted based on the current context with every request for patient 
data. Whenever a request is received, the leak mitigation triangle of activity theory is used to 
generate the policy sets.  
Each user request is framed in the form of a privilege set by specifying the role, 
organization and the data set. This request set is compared with the privilege set to decide 
whether the rights should be granted. The primary objective in this case is to prevent illegal 
information flow from one organization to the other. Based on the definition of information flow, 
in order to prevent illegal information flows we have to provide restrictions in the form of 
obligations. The restriction will be enforced at the client side by executing policies containing 
rules to permit/deny access to the information. 
In order to compute the new set of obligations, all requests that are not a part of the 
privilege set are added into E, where E contains the illegal information flows (in form of tuples). 
For each illegal information flow in E, a “deny” obligation (or restriction) is added, if the 
obligation is not already present. Such an obligation prevents the current user from tampering 
with the patient data, and setting liberal rights on the data. Also when a new patient is enrolled 
the privilege sets of all the users are recomputed. When a patient is deleted, the static access 
rights are checked and if allowed then data is deleted and privilege sets of all users are updated.  
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CONCLUSION 
Due to migration to EHR, issues with respect to security and privacy have become 
amplified. One such issue is PHI leak that has become a concern for the healthcare providers, 
insurance companies and pharmacies. Further, the issue of PHI leak is aggravated due to the 
transitivity of health workflows. Borrowing from the DCD literature, and following the 
guidelines provided by Pramanik et al. (2004), as a solution to PHI leak problem, we develop a 
methodology for detection and mitigation of PHI leaks by employing activity theory to 
understand the various activities in the workflow. In doing so, this work offers significant 
advances to the document control domain as well as the healthcare literature in that it (a) 
illustrates methodology for leak detection and mitigation in transitive workflows (b) adapts 
activity theory to enforce security policies for PHI leaks. 
There are few limitations of our work. First, different organizations have different role 
hierarchy. Our methodology does not take this into consideration. Second, the security policies 
are applied at the user machine, and are not transitive like the patient information in workflow. 
There are a few areas that we have identified to further this research. First, the security policies 
should be made dynamic and should be transferred along with the information. Second, a 
framework for prototype system should be developed using an open source system like OSCAR 
GI (Chan and Gallagher 2007) in the Canadian Healthcare System that can interface with 
existing healthcare systems. Third, a simulation based on the proposed methodology for 
illustrating its effectiveness. 
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